Smoke and Mirrors: Florida\u27s Tobacco-Related Medicaid Costs May Turn Out to Be a Mirage by May, Christopher
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 50 Issue 4 Article 6 
5-1997 
Smoke and Mirrors: Florida's Tobacco-Related Medicaid Costs 
May Turn Out to Be a Mirage 
Christopher May 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher May, Smoke and Mirrors: Florida's Tobacco-Related Medicaid Costs May Turn Out to Be a 
Mirage, 50 Vanderbilt Law Review 1061 (2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol50/iss4/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Smoke and Mirrors: Florida's Tobacco-Related
Medicaid Costs May Turn Out to Be a Mirage
"Florida's sunshine will surely clear the smokescreen that the tobacco
companies have put up for so long."
-Lawton Chiles, Governor of Florida'
"We don't intend to lose."
-Daniel W. Donohue, Deputy General Counsel for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco C0.2
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1. Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Florida 1 (Aug. 9, 1996) ("Press Release
of August 9, 1996").
2. Mark Hansen, Capitol Offensive, 83 ABA J. 50, 53 (Jan. 1997). Mr. Donohue charac-
terized Florida's action as lacking "merit in law or fact." Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1950s, anti-tobacco forces and the United States
government have widely publicized the harm that the consumption of
cigarettes can cause to humans.3 Smoking causes diseases of the oral
cavity, cardio-pulmonary system, larynx, and bladder.4 In addition,
the use of tobacco may also be related to sterility, ulcers, cancers of
several internal organs,5 and even blindness. 6 The severity of the
consequences increases with the amount of consumption.
7
Experts estimate that 400,000 Americans die each year from
smoking s almost one out of every five deaths.9 In addition, the
Surgeon General reports that as many as 2,400 deaths occur annually
because of the inhalation of second-hand smoke.1° Such large numbers
contrast sharply with the recent increase in health consciousness
among so many Americans.1 Although consumption of cigarettes is
3. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 Stan. L. Rev.
853, 856-57 (1992).
4. Elizabeth A. Frohlich, Statutes Aiding States' Recovery of Medicaid Costs from Tobacco
Companies: A Better Strategy for Redressing an Identifiable Harm?, 21 Am. J. L. & Med. 445,
446 (1995). In spite of overwhelming evidence supporting this conclusion, id. at 445, tobacco
companies continue to assert that no study has ever conclusively shown smoking to be injurious.
Hansen, 83 ABA J. at 50 (cited in note 2). The companies also continue to claim that nicotine is
not addictive. Id.
5. Frohlich, 21 Am. J. L. & Med. at 446 (cited in note 4).
6. Doug Levy, Smoking Found to Increase Sight Risk, USA Today 1A (Oct. 9, 1996)
(discussing risk of macular degeneration and resultant loss of vision attributable to smoking).
7. Jane G. Gravelle and Dennis Zimmerman, Cigarette Taxes to Fund Health Care
Reform: An Economic Analysis, CRS Report for Congress 6 n.9. (Congressional Research Service,
1994) ("CRS Report for Congress") ("[The magnitude of external effects from tobacco depends in
part on the amount of exposure in packs per day and the number of packs per day.").
8. J. Michael McGinnis and William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United
States, 270 JAMA 2207, 2208 (1993); Timothy Noah, How to Reduce Deaths From Tobacco? Duh.
Take the Toxic Stuff Out of Cigarettes, U.S. News & World Rep. 65-66 (Dec. 30, 1996). This is
greater than the combined totals of deaths caused by alcohol, suicide, fire, automobile accidents,
and HIV/AIDS. Id. at 65.
9. McGinnis and Foege, 270 JAMA at 2208. (cited in note 8).
10. Willard G. Manning, et al., The Cost of Poor Health Habits 4, 83 (Harvard U., 1991)
(citing The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General
(Public Health Service, 1986)). The effects of second hand smoke are less certain than those of
personal consumption of cigarettes. Gravelle and Zimmerman, CRS Report for Congress at 10
(cited in note 7). Florida's lawsuit does not refer to second-hand smoke directly, perhaps because
any incremental health care expense related to the exposure of second-hand smoke cannot be
reasonably calculated. Manning, et al., The Cost of Poor Health Habits at 69-72 (cited in this
note) (discussing difficulty in ascertaining the effect of second-hand smoke). In any case, one
study has shown that second hand smoke generates less of an expense to society than leading a
sedentary lifestyle. Id. at 11. See also Mike France, et al., The World War on Tobacco, Bus.
Week 99 (Nov. 11, 1996). Phillip Morris recently took advantage of this information and
initiated an advertising campaign in Western Europe asserting that second-hand smoke is less
harmful than drinking whole milk or eating cookies. Id.
11. Manning, et al., The Cost of Poor Health Habits at 1 (cited in note 10). Tobacco com-
panies have, of course, sought to counter the image of cigarettes as unhealthy. Id. ("Phillip
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declining in the United States by 1.2% annually,12 the difficulty of
quitting is a factor in the continued high incidence of tobacco-related
deaths.
13
The federal government's response to smoking-related illness,
albeit somewhat belated,14 has been to consistently increase the
regulation of cigarettes. In 1965, Congress enacted the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, which required warning
labels on cigarette packaging.' s Congress banned the advertisement of
cigarettes on television in 1970.16 In 1984, Congress required
billboards advertising cigarettes to display the same warnings
previously required on packages of cigarettes. 17 Most recently, in
1995, the Food and Drug Administration asserted it had broad
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco as a drug.
8
Morris now publishes ... a free magazine extolling the 'smoking lifestyle' and championing
'smokers' rights.' ").
12. Outlook, U.S. News and World Rep. 24 (Nov. 25, 1996). Id. Per capita consumption has
dropped from 4,345 cigarettes annually in 1963, before the advent of the Surgeon General's
warnings on advertisements and retail sale packages, to the 1996 level of 1,891. See also note 15
and accompanying text.
13. Nearly 70% of all smokers want to quit, but cannot. Outlook, U.S. News & World Rep.
at 24 (cited in note 12). This inability to kick the habit may have something to do with the fact
that cigarettes are as addictive as heroin. Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of Smoking:
The Application of Absolute Liability to Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 Ohio St. L. J. 405, 406
(1991). See also Press Release, Excerpts of Documents and Statements by Cigarette Companies,
Office of the Governor, State of Florida 1 (quoting an internal Brown & Williamson memorandum
of July 17, 1963, "Nicotine is addictive") (on file with the Author).
14. Some states prohibited tobacco use altogether in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Jendi B. Reiter, Citizens or Sinners?-The Economic and Political Inequity
of "Sin Taxes" on Tobacco and Alcohol Products, 29 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 443, 445 (1996).
Indeed, as early as 1601, smoking was seen as "a custom loathsome to the eye, hateful to the
nose, harmful to the brain, [and] dangerous to the lungs." Daniel W. Donohue, The States Are
Asking Courts to Abolish Principles of Factual and Legal Proximate Cause, 83 ABA J. 56, 56 (Jan.
1997) (quoting King James of England).
15. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965),
codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994 ed.). This legislation has been amended since
then to increase the efficacy or at least the stridency of the required warnings. Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2,84 Stat. 88 (1970), codified'as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1333; Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200,
2201-02 (1984), codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333. Presently, the Comprehensive Smoking
Education Act requires that four health advisories be rotated, one to appear in all cigarette
advertisements and on all cigarette packs. Id. § 4, 98 Stat. at 2201-03, 15 U.S.C. § 1333.
16. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87, 89
(1970), codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (making it unlawful to advertise cigarettes on
any electronic medium "subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission").
17. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200, 2202,
codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333.
18. Analysis Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Jurisdiction Over Nicotine-
Containing Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453 (Aug. 11, 1995).
See also id. at 41,488, 41,536-37 (discussing pharmacological and physiological nervous system
effects of nicotine). The FDA makes it clear, however, that it presently only seeks to regulate
tobacco sales to minors. Id. at 41,786. Thus far, the FDA has restricted the sale of tobacco from
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Individual plaintiffs have repeatedly sought damages from
tobacco companies for illnesses allegedly caused by smoking.
However, these efforts have generally failed.19 Such lawsuits can be
grouped into two "waves."20 The plaintiffs in the first wave of suits
relied upon negligence and warranty theories of recovery.21 Few of the
first wave cases went to trial and none was successful.22 In 1965, the
American Law Institute effectively ended the first wave of tobacco
litigation by publishing the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A comment i.23 Comment i specifically absolved tobacco producers
from liability under section 402A unless the plaintiff could show a
manufacturing defect causing a cigarette to be more injurious than a
consumer would ordinarily anticipate.2
The second wave of anti-tobacco litigation commenced in the
1980s and persists to the present day.25 Successful product liability
suits involving toxic harm26 comprised the second wave. Nonetheless,
factors such as the large amount of resources invested by tobacco
companies in their defense,2 7 preemption, of claims by a federal
cigarette labeling law,28 difficulties in proving causation,29 and
affirmative defenses such as assumption of risk3 have limited the
success of the second wave. After over forty years of smoking-related
lawsuits against the tobacco companies,31 only two plaintiffs have been
vending machines accessible to minors and limited tobacco advertising in certain youth-oriented
publications. Noah, U.S. News & World Rep. at 66 (cited in note 8). Eventually, the FDA may
seek to proscribe tobacco advertising at sporting events. Doug Levy and Nanci Hellmich, FDA's
Tobacco Regulations Final Triumph for Departing Chief Kessler, USA Today 4D (Feb. 17, 1997).
19. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
20. Rabin, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 857-64 (cited in note 3) (discussing the first wave of litiga-
tion).
21. Id. at 859.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 863 n.66; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. i (1965).
24. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. i (cited in note 23); Rabin, 44 Stan. L. Rev.
at 863 (cited in note 3) (stating that the Restatement greatly influenced the courts in absolving
tobacco producers from liability).
25. Rabin, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 864 (cited in note 3).
26. Id. at 864-65 (explaining that successful asbestos cases encouraged a second wave of
tobacco litigation).
27. Id. at 867-68 (describing the tobacco industry's attorneys' litigation tactics).
28. Id. at 869.
29. Id. at 870 (noting cases such as Marsee v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 319 (10th Cir.
1989), in which a jury found that a 19-year-old's death from tongue cancer was not related to his
use of tobacco).
30. Id. at 871.
31. The first recorded lawsuit was Lowe v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9673(c) (E.D.
Mo.) (filed Mar. 10, 1954), cited in Rabin, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 857 n.26 (cited in note 3). The
action was later dropped.
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successful in obtaining even an initial damage award.32 Still, tobacco
companies have not yet paid one penny of damages.3
Today, an entirely new type of plaintiff has emerged: state
governments. Presently, two dozen states are suing to recover
tobacco-related medical expenses.4 The first of the cases is scheduled
to go to trial in Mississippi in early March 1997.35 While each of the
many actions has different strategies, all are built on the premise that
the wrongful conduct of cigarette manufacturers has caused increased
health care costs and thus has injured the state government itself.36
Indeed, many aspects of the Florida controversy discussed in this
Note, including the use of statistics to show the extent of injury,
employment of econometric modeling to determine cost savings, and
application of cigarette excise taxes to mitigate net damages suffered
by the states, are virtually certain to be components of any state's
case. These state-sponsored lawsuits may have the best chance for
success of any anti-tobacco lawsuits filed to date.7 If the states do
succeed, the defendant tobacco companies will be financially unable to
pay out the quantum of aggregate damages sought by the plaintiffs.38
This, then, may be the third and final wave.3 9
Two states, Florida4o and Massachusetts, 41 have passed special
legislation to enable the state to recover increased Medicaid costs
alleged to be the result of tobacco use.42 This Note focuses on Florida's
action against the producers of cigarettes marketed in that state and
32. Recently, in Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 95-00934 CV-B (Fla. Cir.
Ct. 1996), a court handed a cigarette manufacturer tobacco's second defeat. Hansen, 83 ABA J.
at 51 (cited in note 2). See also Jolie Solomon and Peter Katel, When There's Smoke There's Fire:
A Maverick Florida Lawyer Takes on Big Tobacco, Newsweek 52 (Oct. 28, 1996) (noting that
Carter was the first case to come to trial of 250 suits that plaintiffs attorney Woody Wilner has
filed). Industry lawyers feel certain that the adverse verdict will be overturned on appeal,
matching the same outcome as the only other such verdict, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893
F.2d 541, 583 (3d Cir. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 505 U.S. 504 (1992). See
also Solomon and Katel, Where There's Smoke, There's Fire at 52 (cited in this note).
33. Hansen, 83 ABA J. at 50 (cited in note 2).
34. Id. at 52.
35. Id. at 51.
36. Id. at 52.
37. Frohlich, 21 Am. J. L. & Med. at 446-47 (cited in note 4).
38. Each of these suits has hundreds of millions of dollars of damages at stake, enough in
the aggregate to bankrupt the tobacco industry. Id. at 446. See Kathryn Ericson, Questions
Submitted to High Courts on Attorney General Powers in Two State Tobacco Suits, West's Legal
News, 1996 WL 258659, 1 (Feb. 22, 1996).
39. In addition, there are still hundreds of individual and class-action product liability
suits pending against the tobacco companies. Hansen, 83 ABA J. at 51 (cited in note 2).
40. Fla. Stat. § 409.910 (Supp. 1994).
41. 1994 Mass. Acts. ch. 60, § 276. For a complete overview of the Massachusetts law, see
generally Frohlich, 21 Am. J. L. & Med. at 463 (cited in note 5).
42. Because Florida's case will come to trial earlier, this Note focuses on Florida's case
instead of Massachusetts.
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also against a related organization, the Council for Tobacco
Research. 43 It addresses issues implicated in Florida's proof of dam-
ages.44 Florida's litigation is worthy of investigation by other states
because it presents many issues with which a state considering to-
bacco litigation must grapple. Part I provides general background
information on the topic. Part II reviews the present litigation and
surveys its contours. Part III presents a summary of applicable
Florida damages law and examines the determination of damages in-
fact in the ongoing controversy. Part IV concludes that legislative
action on the national level may offer the best solution to the economic
costs caused by the manufacture, distribution, and consumption of
tobacco products in the United States.
II. FLORIDA CONFRONTS BIG TOBACCO
A. Laying the Groundwork: Florida's Cigarette Habit and the
Legislative Response
Over 28,000 Floridians die each year from tobacco-related
diseases.45 Indeed, Florida claims it has spent in excess of $1.3 billion
treating its indigent citizens for cigarette-connected ailments since
1989.46 Lawton Chiles, Florida's Governor, maintains that 860,000
43. The Council is the "successor in interest" to the Tobacco Institute Research Committee.
Complaint, Chiles v. The American Tobacco Co., et al. (No. 95-1466-AO) 1 33 ("Complaint").
These companies are named individually in the Complaint, id. 16-39, but they have been
represented by a Florida trade association, Associated Industries, in other litigation. See
generally Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Florida, Inc., 678 So.2d 1239,
1239, cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3629 (Fla. Mar. 17, 1997).
44. This Note concerns compensatory damages. Punitive damages, which go beyond any
actual expense incurred by the plaintiff, Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So.2d 545,
547 (Fla. 1981), will not be discussed.
45. Press Release, Fact Sheet, Office of the Governor, State of Florida (on file with the
Author); Executive Order No. 95-109, Office of the Governor, State of Florida 1 (Mar. 28, 1995).
It is unclear how Florida's status as a popular retirement spot affects this number.
46. Fact Sheet, Office of the Governor at 1 (cited in note 45). Medicaid is a government
medical services financing program initiated in the 1960s to care for indigent persons and others
unable to provide necessary health care. Affidavit of J. Christopher Pilley, Former Director of
Medicaid, State of Mississippi, In re Mike Moore, Attorney General ex rel, State of Mississippi
Tobacco Litigation 7 (on file with the Author). In general, Medicaid coverage includes the
medical expenses of those persons receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children and
Supplemental Security Income. Health Care Financing Administration Fact Sheet, Medicaid,
Dep't of Health and Human Services 1 (Jan. 1991) ("HCFA Fact Sheet"). States must provide the
following services: inpatient hospital services, outpatient services, physician services, laboratory
and x-ray services, nursing home and home health care services, family planning, nurse-
midwifery services, prenatal care, and transportation, if necessary. Id. at 1-2. A state
compensates the providers of the services. Id. at 2. The federal government then reimburses the
1066
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Floridians covered by Medicaid were treated at government expense
for smoking-related disease during 1994, 1995, and 1996.
4
7
In response, Florida's legislature passed the Medicaid Third
Party Liability Act ("MTPLA") into law on May 26, 1994.4 Significant
controversy surrounded the passage of the Act,49 as demonstrated by
the Florida legislature's subsequent vote one year later to repeal the
law.50 However, Governor Chiles vetoed the repeal. 51
The MTPLA is a vague statute. It allows the state, under any
theory of recovery, to proceed against any party that causes the state
to incur increased Medicaid expenses.52 The MTPLA also creates a
new cause of action 53 that is independent of any right or claim of a
Medicaid recipient.54 The evident purpose of the MTPLA is to ensure
that Florida's Medicaid program is the payer of last resort.5 5 The
state for a portion of the costs of the program. Federal funds pay an average of 56% of the cost of
the Medicaid program nationwide, with a range of 50% to 83%, inversely related to each state's
average per-capita income. Id. The federal share is funded by a national payroll tax. Johnathan
S. Massey, The Florida Tobacco Liability Law: Fairy Tale Objections to a Reasonable Solution to
Florida's Medicaid Crisis, 46 Fla. L. Rev. 591, 600 (1994) (citation omitted).
Approximately 26 million individuals in the states and territories of the United States
received Medicaid assistance in 1991. HCFA Fact Sheet at 2 (cited in this note). Medicaid
coverage extends to over 10% of the adult population under 65. Selected Highlights, United
States 1995, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service 11 ("Selected
Highlights"). In Florida, Medicaid treated over 1.7 million people in 1994. Press Release, Office
of the Governor, State of Florida 2 (Oct. 15, 1996) ("Press Release of October 15, 1996"). The
number of adults under age 65 receiving Medicaid coverage has nearly doubled since 1984.
Selected Highlights at 11. Only 5.3% of adults age 65 and older are covered by Medicaid. Id.
Florida's total Medicaid expenses have risen almost $1 billion each year since the early
1990s. Massey, 46 Fla. L. Rev. at 602 (cited in this note). As a result, Florida's government is in
search of additional funding for the Medicaid program.
47. Press Release of October 15, 1996 at 2 (cited in note 45).
48. 1994 Fla. Laws § 94-251, § (4) codified at Fla. Stat. § 409.910 (Supp. 1994). Although
Florida has taken a fairly unique step in seeking recovery of Medicaid expenses through the
MTPLA, all states have statutory authorization to pursue reimbursement from the party or
parties causing increased expenses to the Medicaid program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a)(25) (1994
ed.) (providing statutory authority for states to take all reasonable measures to ascertain the
legal liability of third parties to pay for care and services provided pursuant to the Medicaid
program). The MTPLA is unique because it eliminates many of the tobacco companies' best
defenses and allows the use of statistical evidence alone to prove damages. See notes 57-65 and
accompanying text.
49. In fact, the MTPLA was rushed through in a late evening vote on the last day of the
legislative session. Karen E. Meade, Breaking Through the Smoke Screen, State Lawsuits for
Reimbursements of Medical Expenses, 17 J. Legal Med. 113, 128 (1996).
50, Chiles to Veto Anti-Tobacco Repeal, Wash. Post All (May 8, 1995).
51. Suein Huang, Judge Upholds Law Letting Florida Sue Tobacco Industry, Wall St. J. B6
(June 19, 1995).
52. Fla. Stat. § 409.910(1)(a).
53. Kathryn Ericson, Florida Judge Dismisses Some Counts in State Tobacco Case; Post-
1994 Negligence and Products Liability Claims Remain, West's Legal News, 1996 WL 527454, 1
(Sept. 19, 1996).
54. Fla. Stat. § 409.910(6)(a).
55. Id. § 409.910(1).
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MTPLA thus provides a mechanism for recovering costs of medical
care provided at state expense from those who caused the predicate
injury to Medicaid recipients. 56
The statute aids Florida in recovering Medicaid funds in sev-
eral ways. First, the MTPLA automatically assigns a Medicaid
recipient's right to sue to the state, allowing Florida to subrogate57 the
recipient's claim upon the recipient's receipt of Medicaid services or
fumding. 58 The MTPLA also allows the state to pursue an action on
behalf of the assigned claims of the entire class of Medicaid recipients
against an individual or aggregate defendant without identifying each
individual of the class.59 Second, the statute, in its original form prior
to a ruling by Florida's Supreme Court,60 allowed the state to pursue
its claim under both market share liability theory and joint and
several liability theory,61 while allowing the plaintiff to prove damages
in the aggregate solely with statistical evidence.62 Finally, the MTPLA
precludes the affirmative defenses most successfully employed by
cigarette manufacturers in prior suits.6
56. Id. § 409.910(6).
57. Subrogation enables one party to recover an incurred expense on behalf of another due
to some obligation that is usually contractual. Richard N. Pearson, The Florida Medicaid Third
Party Liability Act, 46 Fla. L. Rev. 609, 611 (1994). In addition, because the federal government
requires the state to provide Medicaid coverage at a certain level, see note 44, the state avoids
Florida's economic loss rule, at least to the level of mandated payments. This economic loss rule
precludes the claimant's recovery for losses unconnected with physical injury or damage to
property. McDonough Equip. Corp. v. Sunset Amoco West, Inc., 669 So.2d 300, 302 (Fla. Ct. App.
1996) (citations omitted) (explaining the economic loss rule and its genesis in products liability
cases). See Part III.A for a discussion of elements of damages in-fact in this case.
58. Fla. Stat. § 409.910(14).
59. Id. § 409.910(9).
60. See note 90 and accompanying text.
61. Florida's Supreme Court altered this particular aspect of the MTPLA, allowing the
state to use only one theory. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So.2d at 1256. See note 90 and
accompanying text.
62. Fla. Stat. § 409.910(9).
63. The Act removes "[pjrinciples of common law and equity as to assignment, lien, subro-
gation, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and all other affirmative defenses normally
available to a liable third party" so that the state may be "[ensured a] full recovery by Medicaid
from third-party resources." Id. § 409.910(1). Assumption of risk connotes that the injured party
willfully subjected himself or herself to a "known and appreciated danger." Meade, 19 J. Legal
Med. at 118 (cited in note 49) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 123 (West, 6th ed. 1990)).
However, the defendants may still argue that the state was negligent in allowing the sale of
cigarettes. If so determined, this would allow a reduction in any damage award by the
percentage of fault were the state found to be accountable by some measure. Although the
comparative fault doctrine is not technically an element of the proof of damages, it may
nonetheless have significant bearing in the damage award in this case and in others in the many
states following this principle. Because any reduction in damages awarded that may result from
a comparative fault analysis is impossible to quantify or predict, it will not be the subject of
further examination.
1068
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The Act also gives the state an important advantage by in-
structing the court to construe the rules of causation and damages
liberally in favor of the state.64 The court, however, is not obliged to
admit erroneous statistical evidence or to "compel [the factfinder] to
find that a particular quantum of statistical evidence offered by the
state is good enough to prove.., damages by a preponderance of the
evidence." 6
5
B. Florida's Case Against Tobacco
The State of Florida brought an action under the MTPLA66 on
February 21, 199567 against the manufacturers of cigarettes marketed
in the state as well as their trade organizations and public relations
firms.r The state alleges that the defendants suppressed the devel-
opment of safer cigarettes, 69 conspired to deceive the public about the
safety of cigarettes, 70 and targeted minors as the source of new mar-
kets.71
Florida seeks to recover damages under theories of negli-
gence,'7 2 misrepresentation,'7 conspiracy,7 4 aiding and abetting,75 unjust
enrichment,6 indemnity,77 and product liability.8 It seeks both
64. Fla. Stat. § 409.910(1).
65. Massey, 46 Fla. L. Rev. at 605 (cited in note 46).
66. Complaint 51 (cited in note 43).
67. Id. at 11.
68. Parties named in the complaint are: The American Tobacco Co., American Brands,
Inc., Reynolds Tobacco Co., RJR Nabisco, Inc., Industries PLC, British American Tobacco Co.,
Ltd., Batus Holdings, Inc., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Philip Morris Companies, Inc.,
The Brooke Group, Ltd., Liggett Group, Inc., Liggett & Myers, Inc., Loews Corp., Lorillard Corp.,
United States Tobacco Co. and its Parent UST, Inc., The Council for Tobacco Research-USA, Inc.
(successor in interest to the Tobacco Institute Research Committee), Hill & Knowlton, Inc. (a
public relations firm, Complaint 1 59 (cited in note 43)), and Doral Tobacco Corp. Complaint 1
16-36 (cited in note 43). The Liggett Group, Inc., an original defendant in the action, Complaint,
1 28, has reached a settlement with Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and West
Virginia. Liggett Issues First Tobacco Settlement Checks, 1996 WL 259720, 1 (Apr. 10, 1996).
Liggett's initial payment of $200,000 to the State of Florida is the first installment in what could
reach more than $180 million over 25 years. Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of
Florida 1 (Apr. 11, 1996).
69. Complaint 1170-71 (cited in note 43).
70. Id. 919182-94.
71. Id. 99 95-116.
72. Id. 9 155-59 ("Count Three"); id. 9191 173-78 ("Count Six").
73. Id. 11 180-87 ("Count Seven").
74. Id. 99 188-98 ("Count Eight").
75. Id. 11 199-203 ("Count Nine").
76. Id. 99 141-48 ("Count One").
77. Id. 9 149-54 ("Count Two").
78. Id. 9191 60-65 (strict liability-"Count Four"); id. It 166-72 (breach of warranty-"Count
Five"). See id. 91 53; id. at 1 128 ("Cigarettes are inherently, abnormally, and unreasonably
dangerous."); Ericson, West's Legal News at 1 (cited in note 53).
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pecuniary losses 79 and injunctive relief.80 The state claims that the
adverse health effects8' of cigarettes have caused it to suffer $1.6
billion in smoking-related Medicaid expenses 82 since 1994.83 The case
is set to go to trial on August 4, 1997.84
C. Approval of the Case and the MTPLA by Florida's Supreme Court
Facing the state's onslaught, tobacco manufacturers brought
suit to prevent implementation of the MTPLA and contested its con-
stitutionality.85 The Florida Supreme Court ruled against the tobacco
defendants and allowed the state to continue its action under the
MTPLA's statutory authority, 86 but it restricted the state's ability to
seek recovery to those Medicaid costs for which Florida law allows
recovery 87 and that had accrued after July 1, 1994,88 the date of the
MTPLA's passage.89 In addition, the court ruled that the state could
79. See generally Complaint (cited in note 43) (seeking damages for restitution).
80. The state seeks a court ordered end to "consumer fraud," id. I 208(a), "disclos[ure of]
research," id. I 208(b), "[funding ofi corrective public education," id. 1 208(c), "[taking of]
reasonable and necessary affirmative steps to prevent the distribution and sale of cigarettes to
minors," id. I 208(d), "fund[ing of] smoking cessation programs," id. I 208(e), "dissol[ution of] the
Council for Tobacco Research and the Tobacco Institute," id. I 208(f), and "disgorge[ment of] all
profits from sale of cigarettes in Florida." Id. I 208(g). In short, Florida wants to put cigarette
manufacturers out of business.
81. See notes 4-6 and accompanying text. See also Complaint 11 117-18 (cited in note 43).
82. The state did not seek punitive damages in the initial Complaint, but it reserved the
right to do so at a later time. Complaint 1 10 (cited in note 43).
83. Press Release of October 15, 1996 (cited in note 46). The Complaint does not state an
exact dollar figure. The figure in the Press Release of October 15, 1996 conflicts with the state's
prior estimate of $420 million per annum. Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Florida
(Sept. 17, 1996). The $420 million figure is more in line with the figures the Author obtained.
See Table 1.
84. Press Release of October 15, 1996 at 1 (cited in note 46).
85. See Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So.2d at 1243.
86. Id. at 1256-57. The court also validated the existence of Florida Agency for Health
Care Administration, the permissibility of which had been in question. Id. See also Karen
Pankowski, Deputy Director of Communications, Office of the Governor of the State of Florida,
Untitled Memorandum (June 27, 1996) ("Untitled Memorandum of June 27, 1996") (providing
background on the Florida Supreme Court's tobacco ruling).
87. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So.2d at 1254 (disallowing claims otherwise
prohibited by Florida's statute of repose).
88. This had previously been determined at the trial level and was upheld. Id. at 1256.
For a discussion, see generally James Cahoy, Florida Supreme Court Upholds Most of Tobacco
Liability Law, West's Legal News, 1996 WL 365758 (July 3, 1996).
89. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So.2d at 1256. Florida's governor was said to be
"elated" by the outcome. Pankowski, Untitled Memorandum of June 27, 1996 at 1 (cited in note
86). In fact, each side "claimed victory." Cahoy, 1996 WL 365758 at 1 (cited in note 88).
Governor Chile's delight may have been based in part on the court's description of the MTPLA as
"a rational response to a public need." Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So.2d at 1257.
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proceed under either market share liability theory or joint and several
liability, but not both90
Most importantly for Florida,91 the court allowed the state to
proceed using statistical data to prove damages,9 2 and it found no
constitutional infirmity in the MTPLA's abolition of affirmative
defenses. 93  The court's decision, however, that the use of statistical
evidence must be constrained by the usual rules of procedure and
evidence9 4 undermines any reliance on the MTPLA's requirement that
courts liberally construe rules pertaining to proof of damages. In
addition, the court left the burden of proof on the state.9 5
III. PROOF OF DAMAGES
The usual elements of any tort claim are causation in-fact,
proximate causation, fault, and proof of damages.96 Tobacco's previous
litigation victories have resulted from the plaintiffs difficulty of
proving that cigarettes are in fact harmful97 and the tobacco compa-
nies' effective use of affirmative defenses such as assumption of risk.98
Recent studies, however, have found conclusively that tobacco use
causes cancer.9 As a result, cigarette manufacturers are now under
pressure to admit that tobacco use is harmful, thus preventing
satisfaction of causation-in-fact,' °° and they may be ready to concede
90. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So.2d at 1255-56. This will likely be true in other
states, at least those employing a hybrid of the market share liability and enterprise liability
theories. See Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1986) (erecting theory
of market share liability). See also Hall v. E. L Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp.
353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (applying enterprise liability theory).
91. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So.2d at 1255-56. The use of statistical evidence
by the state to prove the extent of damages removes the necessity to quantify damages on an
individual basis for the thouands of medicaid recipients with tobacco-related diseases and also
prevents tobacco industry lawyers from using such processes to drag out proceedings.
92. Id. at 1256.
93. Id. at 1251.
94. Pankowski, Untitled Memorandum of June 27, 1996 at 1 (cited in note 86) (explaining
the holding in Agency for Health Care Admin.). However, Florida's Supreme Court found the
statutory language allowing the use of statistical data not to be "infirm," finding it "aspirational,"
Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So.2d at 1255, and similar to language found in other
statutes meant to remove "insecurity and uncertainty" in terms of"equitable or legal relations."
95. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So.2d at 1243.
96. Harvey P. Berman, The Agent Orange Veteran Payment Program, 53 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 49, 54 (Autumn 1990).
97. Seuin L. Hwang, Tobacco Firms May Shift Tack on Cancer Link, Wall St. J. B1 (Oct.
21, 1996).
98. See note 30 and accompanying text.
99. Hwang, Wall St. J. at B1 (cited in note 97).
100. Id. Of course, strong indications of smoking's link to cancer have existed for many
years. Current Intelligence Bulletin 54, Environmental Smoke in the Workplace, Lung Cancer
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that cigarettes do cause cancer, which would eliminate any attempted
argument of there being no causation-in-fact. 0'
In addition, the MTPLA prohibits the tobacco firms' use of
certain affirmative defenses. 10 2  If they are unable to rely on
traditional tactics, the defendants in Florida's tobacco litigations will
likely focus on proof of damages to defeat the suits. 10 3
To properly calculate compensatory damages, the quantity of
the actual injury or damages must be reasonably determinedl04 The
state of Florida receives five principal benefits from cigarette consu-
mption: (1) excise taxes directly arising from cigarette consumption;05
(2) the income and other tax receipts generated as a byproduct of
Medicaid payments; (3) federal funding for Medicaid payments; 1' 6 (4) a
reduction in retirement and disability expenses; 07 and (5) lower state
Medicaid costs in areas such as nursing home outlays. 0 8 Calculation
of damages must take into account any benefit the state has received
from tobacco production and consumption.
A. Use of Statistical Evidence as Proof of Damages In-Fact and to
Show Extent of Injury
In the present litigation, the court will not require the state to
identify each Medicaid patient by name. 10 9 This appears to be contrary
to the prior ruling by the Florida Supreme Court"0 and may make the
and Other Effects, Centers for Disease Control 1 (June 1991) ("Current Intelligence Bulletin 54")
(quoting 1964 Surgeon General's first report on smoking and health, "Cigarette smoking is
causally related to lung cancer in men; the magnitude of the effect of cigarette smoking far
outweighs all other factors.... The risk of developing lung cancer increases with duration of
smoking and the number of cigarettes smoked per day, and is diminished by discontinuing
smoking.").
101. Id. at 1 (cited in note 100). See also Donahue, 83 ABA J. at 56 (cited in note 14)
(arguing that proximate, or legal, causation continues to be the source of legal friction).
Proximate cause is an essential element for a plaintiffs cause of action in tort, requiring a
"reasonable connection" between the injury suffered by the plaintiff and the actions of the
defendant. Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts 263 (West, 5th ed. 1984). Causation-in-fact is
the predicate element in any tort claim and is fulfilled if the plaintiffs injury would not have
occured without the defendant's action or omission. Id at 265.
102. See note 63 and accompanying text.
103. See Part llI.B.
104. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 486 (1988).
105. See Part I.C.3.
106. See note 46 and accompanying text.
107. See Part III.C.1.
108. See note 153 and accompanying text.
109. Kathryn Ericson, Florida Doesn't Have to Specifically Name Individual Medicaid
Recipients in Anti-Tobacco Case, Says Judge, West's Legal News, 1996 WL 605334, 1 (Oct. 24,
1996) (citing Order of Oct. 18, 1996). See also Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So.2d at 1254.
110. See Cahoy, West's Legal News at 1 (cited in note 88) (discussing order). It also appears
contrary to Florida damages law in general. See notes 113 and 120 and accompanying text.
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state's case much easier.", The court's decision to allow the state to
refer to people by number alone is especially troubling in light of
recent revelations of a great amount of fraud in the provision of gov-
ernment-funded medical services, including Medicaid."2  Thus, the
precise identification of each individual treated under Medicaid for a
smoking-related disease is absolutely essential, or else damages would
be a vague approximation, even assuming a high degree of precision in
statistical evidence of damages.
3
B. Calculating Compensatory Damage Awards
The basic rationale behind an award of compensatory damages
is that justice should be done to both the defendant and the plaintiff
pursuant to the facts of each case. Thus, a plaintiff is to be "made
whole,""4 or as near thereto as pecuniary compensation can achieve." 5
Once liability has been established,"6 the plaintiff is entitled by right
to compensatory damages."
7
However, the court did order the state to "provide the identity of each individual" through the
use of identifying numbers and lists of Medicaid providers and the payments made to those
providers. Ericson, West's Legal News at 1 (cited in note 109). Medicaid records delivered by the
state to provide the individuals' identities included the patient's Medicaid identification number,
health provider name and Medicaid reference number, patient's date of death where appropriate,
and a summary of medical costs. Press Release of October 15, 1996 at 2 (cited in note 46).
111. The court stated Medicaid providers were the "true recipients" of payments under the
program. Ericson, West's Legal News at 1 (cited in note 109). The court's order has the effect of
greatly constraining the defendants' ability to verify the veracity of individual Medicaid
claimants' injuries and restricting any attempt to substantiate assertions that such injuries were
in fact caused by the consumption of cigarettes.
112. Peter Eisler, Fraud on the Rise: Those Who Get Caught Say It's 'Just Too Easy," USA
Today 1A (Nov. 12, 1996) ("[S]hady operators can easily set up shop and start billing taxpayer-
paid Medicare and Medicaid for services never rendered."). "[Billing fraud is easy to get away
with," noted June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services. Peter Eisler, Increase in Fraud Cases Has Officials On Lookout, USA Today 2A
(Nov. 12, 1996) (discussing increase of fraudulent billing practices in the home health care
industry).
113. Statistical analysis can show vastly divergent outcomes, even given the same inputs,
and may be inherently unreliable. See note 144. This seems particularly important in light of
Florida damages law's requirement that future medical expenses are recoverable only so far as
they are certain to be incurred. Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So.2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1953).
114. Phillips v. Ostrer, 481 So.2d 1241, 1246 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985) (citations omitted)
(indicating damages are to set plaintiff right, as if the injury had never happened).
115. Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1981) ("[The] objective
of compensatory damages is to make the injured party whole to the extent that is possible.");
Bisque Associates of Florida, Inc. v. Towers of Quayside No. 2 Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 639
So.2d 997, 999 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994) ("[The] objective of compensatory damages is to make the
injured party whole to the extent that it is possible to measure the injury sustained in terms of
money.").
116. The tortfeasor is liable for all injury caused by his or her actions. Kokotis v. DeMarco,
679 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996).
117. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Watson, 428 So.2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1983) (citation omitted).
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However, in a typical tort case, the burden of proving the exis-
tence of damages is on the plaintiff.18 Therefore, Florida will have to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence," 9 that increased Medicaid
costs are a result of tobacco consumption and not some other factor, 20
such as the general inclination of smokers to engage in risky activity.
Thus, the plaintiff in a typical tort case must prove the exis-
tence of injury and resultant damages 121 with reasonable certainty. 22
The mere occasion of a tortious act does not by itself give rise to the
right of the claimant to recover damagesm Hence, the plaintiff must
present evidence having some reasonable basis in fact 24 to show there
was an injury actually suffered by the plaintiff that justifies that
recovery. 125 Stated differently, a court may not award damages based
upon speculation. 26 This is relevant in Florida's suit because the state
must show that it has suffered financially from its Medicaid enrollees'
consumption of cigarettes.
While inability to determine damages with "absolute exact-
ness" will not prevent recovery, 127 the plaintiff still must show with
118. Warfield v. Hepburn, 57 So.2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1911).
119. Saporito v. Bone, 195 So.2d 244, 245 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). This test "is more qualitative
than quantitative." Id. (citation omitted) (declaring requirement of evidence of damages to be
"convincding] as of its truth" and "produc[ing] a reasonable belief' of its veracity). See also
Automated Management Systems of Florida, Inc. v. Thomson & McKinnon, Inc., 261 So.2d 531,
531 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972) ("[F]ailure to prove damages [is] fatal to recovery.").
120. Florida law requires that when there are possible multiple causes or a series oftortious
acts in sequence, a party seeking recovery for an injury must delineate between the various
causes and resultant effects to a reasonable extent. See Washewich v. LeFave, 248 So.2d 670,
672 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971) (stating requirement that injuries be delineated is relaxed "where
evidence indicates that the defendant's negligence has proximately resulted in an aggravation of
a pre-existing injury and the entire consequence cannot reasonably be divided").
121. Farrington v. Richardson, 16 So.2d 158, 159 (Fla. 1944) ("If damages claimed are so
remote, contingent, conjectural, and speculative as to be immeasurable pecuniarily, no substan-
tial recovery can be had therefore.").
122. Broxmeyer v. Elie, 647 So.2d 893, 895 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 566, 133 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1995).
123. Trumpet Vine Investments, N.V. v. Union Capital Partners I, Inc., 92 F.3d 1110, 1110
(11th Cir. 1986).
124. Miami Beach Lerner Shops, Inc. v. Walco Manufacturing of Florida, 106 So.2d 233, 235-
36 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958).
125. Florida Ventilated Awning Co. v. Dickson, 67 So.2d 215, 217-18 (Fla. 1953) ("There
must be something to authorize or justify a definite amount in damages before it can be
awarded.").
126. Id. In some cases, the fact that an injury has occurred may be absolutely certain, yet
the calculation of damages suffered by the claimant may be difficult. In such a case, recovery is
not precluded by mere difficulty in determining an exact figure. McCall v. Sherbill, 68 So.2d 362,
364 (Fla. 1953). The legal rule requiring certainty of damages applies to whether there has been
injury in-fact, as opposed to the amount or extent thereof. Saporito, 195 So.2d at 245.
127. Id. See also Conner v. Atlas Aircraft Corp., 310 So.2d 352, 354 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975)
(indicating that while the law does establish minimum proof of damages, exact certainty is not
required). But see Ryan v. Atlantic Fertilizer & Chem. Co., 515 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. Ct. App.
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reasonable certainty that a significant loss has occurred,12 including
reasonable proof of the extent of injury, s before an award of damages
is appropriate.13 0 In addition, in cases concerning recovery of medical
expenses, such as Florida's action, the claimant typically bears the
burden of showing both the reasonableness and the necessity of those
costs. 131 This evidence must be supported by proof and cannot be
merely speculative. 132 Thus, Florida must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that it actually sustained additional Medicaid expenses
because of smoking before it may recover. The state's ability to meet
its burden becomes more difficult because of the inherent
complications in the use of statistical evidence for proving damages.
33
Under Florida law, although calculation of the amount of dam-
ages is entirely the responsibility of the factfnder, 34 a plaintiff that
has actually suffered some injury at the hands of a tortfeasor cannot
be awarded zero damages. 35 Hence, if the jury in Florida's case deter-
mines smoking has had a negative pecuniary effect upon Florida's
Medicaid program, it will be required to determine a damage award.
When damages are certain, but the amount uncertain, the
factfinder has reasonable discretion in determining a proper award,
36
so long as the claimant has suffered substantial damages. 37 Such
1987) ("Unless a claimant proves what his actual damages are... there will be no recovery of
damages.").
128. See notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
129. Trumpet Vine Inv., 92 F.3d at 1119. There are "certain minimum requirements."
Ryan, 515 So.2d at 326.
130. Butler v. Mirabelli, 179 So.2d 868, 873 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965) (construing law of damages
for loss of profit as requiring "competent, substantial, [and] appropriate evidence in the record").
The question of damages in the Florida case under review contains much of the same uncertainty
present in the calculation of damages in an action concerning alleged lost profits.
131. Morris Kirschman & Co. v. Garrett, 308 So.2d 475,477 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975).
132. Asgrow-Kilgore Co. v. Mulford Hickerson Corp., 301 So.2d 441, 445 (Fla. 1974)
("Damages will not be awarded when based on pure speculation." (citations omitted)); John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 324 So.2d at 674 ("[Aiwards for damage must be supported by
evidence and cannot be based on speculation and conjecture."); Florida Outdoor, Inc. v. Stewart,
318 So.2d 414, 415 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975) (noting that damages must have a "reasonable basis in
fact").
133. See Part ]EIIA
134. Phillips, 841 So.2d at 1246; Wise v. Jacksonville Gas Corp., 97 So.2d 704 (Fla. Ct. App.
1957).
135. Cowen v. Thornton, 621 So.2d 684, 687 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993).
136. Mori v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America, 380 So.2d 461, 465 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980)
(citing John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mark-A, Inc., 324 So.2d 674 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975));
ClearwaterAss'n v. Hicks Laundry Equip. Corp., 433 So.2d 7, 8 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983) ('[Djifficulty
in proving.., damages does not preclude recovery if there is some reasonable basis in the
evidence for the amount awarded.").
137. See Florida Builders, Inc. v. Stephenson Tile, Inc., 167 So.2d 58, 59-60 (Fla. Ct. App.
1964) (citation omitted) (reviewing Florida damages in the law of contract). See also McCall, 68
So.2d at 364 ("There is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish
the fact that plaintiff has sustained some damage and the measure of proof necessary to enable
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discretion is undoubtedly terrifying to the cigarette manufacturers. It
suggests the possibility that the factfinder may, rightly or wrongly,
find causation based upon its knowledge from outside the courtroom
that cigarette smoking is harmful. If an inferential leap is made from
that base knowledge it is easy to see how the factfinder might decide
that such injury could be nothing short of substantial. Unfortunately
for the defendants, it will likely take tremendous courtroom presence
to keep the factfinder focused on the banalities of Florida's law of proof
of damages, including its collateral source rule138 while explaining the
arguably unseemly notion that savings may accrue from each smokers'
early demise. 13 9
C. Reduction of Damages
When calculating damages, a court must take into account any
benefits the plaintiff derives from a defendant's conduct in calculating
compensatory damages. 40 Such benefits then offset the total damages
to determine the net damages for which the defendant is held liable.' 4 '
The consumption of cigarettes may be responsible for the loss
of over 5.3 million person-years annually.142 The magnitude of this
human cost, however, tends to obscure an important legal point:
smokers, on average, die at an earlier age than nonsmokers.'43
Smokers also generate greater medical expenses than nonsmokers'"
the jury to fix the amount of damages."). The law of damages in Florida is the same for tort as
for contract except when exemplary damages are appropriate in tort. Florida East Coast
Railway Co. v. Peters, 73 So. 151, 168 (Fla. 1916).
138. See Part I1.C.2.
139. See Part lII.C.1.
140. See notes 163-64 and accompanying text. See also 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 550
(noting that benefits received by the plaintiff in connection with the defendant's behavior at issue
are to be subtracted from gross damages to determine the net recoverable amount).
141. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 550 (cited in note 104).
142. Manning, et al., The Cost of Poor Health Habits at 3 (cited in note 10). A person-year is
the time period of one year applied to one person. For example, one thousand people could each
have their lives shortened by one year, thus one thousand person-years of life would be lost in
the aggregate.
143. A pack of cigarettes reduces one's lifespan over two hours per pack. Id. at 8.
144. Id. at 11. Even though smokers are not more likely to visit a doctor during their
lifetime than those who have never smoked, smokers are far more likely to require
hospitalization.
All researchers do not agree that smokers cost more in terms of medical bills. In fact, one
study focusing on diseases that were clearly smoking related found that smokers have lower
lifetime medical expenses than nonsmokers due to their earlier demise. Gravelle and
Zimmerman, CRS Report for Congress at 53 (cited in note 7). But see, for example, Thomas A.
Hodgson, Cigarette Smoking and Lifetime Medical Expenditures, 70 Milbank Q. 81, 90-110 (1992)
(suggesting overall greater expenses for smokers than the Manning study). This Note relies
primarily on figures from the Manning study because it has been widely accepted by scholars.
See Gravelle and Zimmerman, CRS Report for Congress at 4 (cited in note 7) (discussing effective
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at all ages 145 and among all races, 146 during their lifetimes. Thus, in-
cremental expenses may be offset by the fact that smokers do not live
to receive all of the benefits non-smokers presumably receive. 147 As a
result, the state may actually save money on smokers by avoiding the
payment of these expenses.
The overall benefit accruing to state and federal governments
from smokers' early deaths is magnified because smokers tend to die
at the end of a normal working life. 148 While nonsmokers live beyond
their productive years into years that are often accompanied by
chronic disease and tremendous medical expenses, 49 smokers' lifetime
contribution to society, and by extension the state, is maximized,
50
and some smokers are likely to contribute nearly as much or more
than nonsmokers in terms of state tax revenue while receiving fewer
benefits.
1. Calculation of Savings from Smokers' Lower Life Expectancy
Over the course of an average smoker's life, he or she will
consume 16,300 packs of cigarettes.' 5' Each pack of cigarettes
translates into twenty-six cents of incremental medical expense for the
smoker's smoking-related medical requirements. 152 For the purpose of
determining Medicaid expenses, this expense is offset in part by a
savings of three cents per pack in nursing home care not utilized by a
controls used in the Manning study). The Manning study sought to identify all monetary
expenses and savings due to the consumption of cigarettes and to factor in necessary controls for
other characteristics that may affect variances in health care costs for smokers and nonsmokers.
One example of such a necessary control factor is that people who smoke cigarettes are also
likely to engage in high risk activities and are therefore more likely to incur additional health
care expenses from accidents and the like. Id. at 8 (citing W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Making the
Risky Decision (Oxford U., 1992)). For a detailed discussion of Manning study controls, see id. at
3-8.
145. Kenneth E. Warner, Health and Economic Implications of a Tobacco-Free Society, 258
JAMA 2080, 2084 (1987).
146. Manning, et al., The Cost of Poor Health Habits at 63 (cited in note 10).
147. Id. at 7. In fact, if society as a whole were the plaintiff; collection of damages would be
impossible under Florida law. Every pack of cigarettes consumed actually saves society 91 cents.
Id. at 15.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Warner, 258 JAMA at 2085 (cited in note 145). Because smokers have shorter
lifespans, however, they will pay less in taxes to finance all government programs, including
those that benefit them personally. Willard G. Manning, et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers
and Drinkers Pay Their Own Way?, 261 JAMA 1604, 1605 (1989). It would seem proper to
include those lost taxes in any recovery Florida. This is another benefit of using the Manning
analysis. See also notes 144 and accompanying text; Gravelle and Zimmerman, CRS Report for
Congress at 15-17 (cited in note 7).
150. Warner, 258 JAMA at 2084 (cited in note 145).
151. Manning, et al., The Cost of Poor Health Habits at 75 (cited in note 10).
152. Id. at 79, Table 4-16 (using the 5% discount rate for present value).
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prematurely-dying smoker.153 Therefore, the total health care cost of
smoking is twenty-three cents per pack, and the incremental costs of
smoking per person may be quantified as $3,749 per smoker,
discounted for present value.5 4 Balancing against that expense, the
state saves $489 per smoker in nursing home care costs.
155
Florida reaps benefits from the early demise of smokers other
than reduced nursing home Medicaid expenses. Pensions and dis-
ability payments disbursed over the lifetime of smokers are dramati-
cally lower than those paid out to persons who have never smoked.
56
Assuming 16,300 packs per smoker, a typical smoker will receive
$3,912 less in lifetime pension and disability payments than a typical
nonsmoker. 57 Most pension and disability payments not made to
Medicaid recipients who are smokers not only create savings for
private insurers,'5 but also benefit government programs at the state
and federal level.
Although this analysis would seem to yield a total of $163 per
smoker benefit, 59 the factfinder cannot properly use their figures to
offset Florida's expenses unless the savings are actually realized by
the state. Hence, the number of smokers employed by the state and
otherwise entitled to state disability coverage and retirement benefits
must be determined before any net savings are quantified. The
factfinder must then apply such savings to reduce the increase in total
state outlays for smoking-related expense.
160
2. The Collateral Source Rule
153. Id. at 75. However, this figure may be as high as 23 cents per pack according to other
researchers. Memorandum in Support of the State's Motion for Ruling in Limine, In Re Mike
Moore, Attorney General ex rel, State of Mississippi Tobacco Litigation, No. 94-1429 at 25 (citing
W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking, Duke U. Working
Paper, 1994). If this latter figure is the correct one, "there is a net cost savings" for medical
expenses from the consumption of cigarettes. Id.
154. Manning, et al., The Cost of Poor Health Habits at 75 (cited in note 10). All Manning
figures are discounted for present value at the rate most likely to be correct, a 5% rate. See
Gravelle and Zimmerman, CRS Report for Congress at 9 (cited in note 7).
155. The total nursing home care savings is the product of the number of the average packs
of cigarettes per lifetime per smoker (16,300) multiplied by the cost savings per pack (three
cents) for a total of $489. See notes 151 and 153 and accompanying text.
156. Manning, et al., The Cost of Poor Health Habits at 79 (cited in note 10).
157. Id. at 78.
158. It is unlikely that Medicaid recipients have private or state pensions and disability
plans given the nature of the program. See note 46 and accompanying text.
159. That is, if the savings derived from smokers' reduced life span ($3,912) were deducted
from the total incremental costs associated with smoking ($3,749). See notes 154 and 157 and
accompanying text.
160. Calculation of such savings by the government in general or states individually is
obviously difficult to quantify. While figures for such savings may remain unavailable, the
factfinder has the power to determine these figures.
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The collateral source rule is a common law concept that allows
a claimant full recovery, without a setoff for any compensation
received from a third party who is fully independent of the
tortfeasor.161 The factfinder is normally unaware of the third party's
independent compensation.
Application of the collateral source rule in Florida is limited to
benefits earned by the injured party.6 2 The factfinder does not
consider compensation that is dependent upon the plaintiffs own ac-
tion and expense in the calculation of damages. 63 The defendant may
present evidence of unearned compensation to the factfinder. The
factfinder may then use such compensation to offset the damage
award.'6 To do otherwise may give an undeserved windfall to the
plaintiff.16 Florida's Supreme Court put it succinctly:
The purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate... it is not the
purpose of such damages to punish defendants or to bestow a windfall upon
plaintiffs. The view that a windfall, if any is to be enjoyed, should go to the
plaintiff... borders too closely upon approval of unwarranted punitive
damages, and it is not a view espoused by our cases.
166
Florida's statutory law supports and reinforces this common law
concept 6 7 and Florida law thus prevents double recovery.
168
161. Stanley v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 425 So.2d 608, 609 (Fla. Ct. App.
1982) (citation omitted); Janes v. Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc., 349 So.2d 672, 673 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1977) (indicating that a tortfeasor should not benefit from the plaintiffs insurance
compensation). But see Robert E. Owen & Assoc., Inc. v. Gyongyosi, 433 So.2d 1023, 1025 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1983) (incorporating Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A (1977) into Florida damages
law). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A (1977) provides in relevant part: "(1) A payment
made by a tortfeasor or by a person acting for him to a person whom he has injured is credited
against his tort liability .... (2) Payments made to or benefits conferred from other sources are
not credited against the tortfeasor's liability...." Id. Many states have a similar rule. See 22
Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 566 (stating that courts generally apply the collateral source rule).
162. Florida Physician's Insurance Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So.2d 514, 515 (Fla. 1984).
163. Economy Fire and Casualty Co., 629 So.2d at 627. For example, payments received
from the plaintiffs own insurance company are not offset against damages. Id. The reason
behind this policy is to prevent the cautious plaintiffs from being unduly penalized for providing
their own insurance protection. Id. Florida courts will go so far as to award a windfall to the
plaintiff to promote such caution and to promote generally the balance of equities. See Respess v.
Carter, 585 So.2d 987, 990 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991) ("The principle behind [this rule] is that it is
better for the wronged plaintiff to receive a potential windfall than for a tortfeasor to be relieved
of responsibility for the wrong."). But see Florida Physician's Insurance Reciprocal, 452 So.2d at
516 (noting that Florida law disallows compensatory damages that appear to be a windfall as
undeserved punitive damages). See note 166 and accompanying text
164. Florida Physician's Insurance Reciprocal, 452 So.2d at 516.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 515.
167. Florida law provides:
[Tihe court shall reduce the amount of such an award by the total of all amount which
have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are available to him, from all
collateral sources; however, there shall be no reduction for collateral sources which a
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Under Florida's collateral source rule, then, the tobacco com-
panies will apparently not be entitled to a set-off of federal funds used
in Florida's Medicaid program. Obviously, the federal government
acted independently of the cigarette manufacturers named in the
Florida suit when it created Medicaid. In addition, the federal gov-
ernment directed the states to provide procedures for Medicaid reim-
bursement actions predicated upon third party liability.
16 9
However, federal programs benefit from the early death of
smokers in the same way as does Florida's Medicaid program. 70 As a
result, any such federal savings, at the very least that associated with
the Medicaid program, should offset any damage award the state
seeks. The calculation of a set-off for the cost savings of the federal
share follows the same numerical analysis, and suffers the same
pitfalls, as the previously outlined state savings.
171
3. Cigarette Excise Taxes Offset Damages
The primary benefit Florida enjoys in connection with the sale
and use of cigarettes is the huge amount of revenue cigarette sales
generate for the state's coffers. Florida gains tax revenues from the
sale of tobacco products above and beyond the revenue generated from
the sale of other products because of special excise taxes. 172 This eco-
nomic benefit is a direct result of the consumption of cigarettes by
citizens of Florida.
subrogation or reimbursement right exists. Such reduction shall be offset to the extent of
any amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on behalf of, the
claimant or members of his immediate family to secure his right to any collateral source
benefit which he is receiving as a result of his injury.
Collateral Sources of Indemnity, codified at Fla. Stat. § 768.76 (1994).
168. Fla. Stat. § 627.7372 (1991); Economy Fire and Casualty Co., 629 So.2d at 267 ("Under
Florida's collateral source rule ... the total amount of benefits a claimant receives from collateral
sources is to be deducted from the jury verdict, thus preventing the plaintiff from reaping a
double recovery.").
169. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (1994). See also id. § 433.135. The States are authorized by federal
statute to seek reimbursement on behalf of the Medicaid program from third parties. 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(25).
170. Federal savings from programs such as Medicare may be dramatic and therefore
important to the programs' longevity. Warner, 258 JAMA at 2084 (cited in note 145).
171. See Part I1.C.
172. Fla. Stat. ch. 210 et seq. (1994). An excise tax is a "tax on the manufacture, sale, or use
of goods." Black's Law Dictionary 563 (West, 6th ed. 1990). Other states also impose excise
taxes on cigarettes, as well. See, for example, Miss. Code Ann. § 27-69-13(a) (1993). Federal and
state excise taxes across the nation average 50 cents per pack, with the federal portion
amounting to 24 cents. Gravelle and Zimmerman, CRS Report for Congress at 1 (cited in note 7).




Cigarette excise taxes apply only to cigarettes 73 and are im-
posed on top of the other Florida sales taxes. 74 Thus, every time a
pack of cigarettes is sold, the state receives a direct benefit. 7 5 Funds
generated by cigarette excise taxes, however, are not always set aside
to pay smoking-related costs, 176 nor are they used to defray medical
expenses in each case when earmarked to do so. 177 Thus, at the same
time the state uses income derived from the sale of cigarettes to defray
its general expenses, it seeks recovery of smoking-related medicaid
expenses without the benefit of a set-off for the tobacco companies.
Smokers usually consume cigarettes for many years before a
tobacco-related disease appears. 178 In addition, for any state, a dollar
in hand today is worth more than a dollar to be received in the
future179 and less than a dollar received yesterday. It follows, then,
that while Florida cannot recover pre-1994 Medical expenses,80 excise
taxes collected for years prior are an important component in deter-
mining any net damages the state's Medicaid program actually
incurred.
D. Florida's Analysis
Florida must analyze what it has to lose by pursuing this liti-
gation. That analysis must consider the impact of the potential loss of
cigarette excise taxes. In the thirteen years preceding the passage of
the MTPLA, cigarette excise taxes collected by the state of Florida
totaled $4.5 billion. 1 1 Government data indicate that during those
same years Florida's Medicaid program bore total smoking-related
173. Fla. Stat. § 210.02 (1) (Supp. 1994).
174. Id.
175. See In re Mike Moore, Attorney General ex rel, State of Mississippi Tobacco Lit., No. 94-
1249, Affidavit of William F. Shugart 1I 8 (on file with the Author). Income lost to the state
due to discontinuation of the sale of cigarettes would not likely be made up in other areas
because the state does not apply excise taxes to most other goods. See id. 9.
176. See, for example, Orange County Delay in Payment Cleared by Its Noteholders, Wall St.
J. C15 (July 10, 1995) (stating that cigarette tax to be used to pay debts unrelated to smoking).
See also Frank Phillips, Weld Aides Reportedly Duck News Conference: Governor Shunning
Tobacco Lawsuit, Boston Globe 39 (Dec. 22, 1995) (noting that Florida abandoned a plan to
utilize cigarette excise taxes to balance the state budget).
177. Robert Keatley, Washington Wire, Wall St. J. Al (Sept. 1, 1995) (considering the impact
of the Governor of California's decision to divert funds generated by excise taxes to other than
prescribed anti-smoking education); Vandall, 52 Ohio St. L. J. at 406 (cited in note 13).
178. Gravelle and Zimmerman, CRS Report for Congress at 16 (cited in note 7).
179. Manning, et al., 261 JAMA at 1607 (cited in note 149).
180. This is especially pertinent because the State of Florida has been allowed to seek
recovery of expenses incurred only subsequent to the passage of the MTPLA. See note 88 and
accompanying text.
181. See Table 1.
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expenses of $1.372 billion,182 not taking into account savings from
shortened life expectancies or other benefits the state received (as
previously outlined).18 Assuming that Florida will not be required to
offset any federally provided funds, Florida's Medicaid program came
out over $3 billion ahead on the consumption of cigarettes in terms of
excise taxes alone between 1980 and 1993.
State revenues from cigarette excise taxes vary from year to
year, but have increased about five percent annually over the thirteen
year period. 18 The same is true for federal cigarette excise tax
receipts. Tax receipts, however, began to decline from smoking over
the last few years of the sample. 185 During the same period, cigarette-
related Medicaid expenses increased at approximately twelve percent
per year.8 6 If these trends continue-as a result of the increase in the
cost of medical care in the United States and the continued
information about the negative health consequences of
smoking-smoking-related Medicaid expenses may exceed excise tax
revenues sometime in the not-so-distant future.
The tobacco manufacturers should be allowed to set-off, in
addition to the other savings and benefits realized by the state,18 7 the
cumulative surplus of over $3 billion. The defendants may also be
entitled to consider federal cigarette excise receipts from Florida over
the same period, 88 which would raise Florida's surplus Medicaid
expenses and excise taxes dramatically. In addition, the surplus's
present value is even higher because of inflation and interest rates.
This present value then must be set-off against the present value of
possible future medical costs that will likely be incurred by Florida's
Medicaid program. 89 Indeed, the state will likely insist that possible
182. Id.
183. See Part HI.C.
184. See Table 1.
185. Id.
186. Id. A simple average, however, does not tell the whole story. The rate of increases in
Medicaid expenses has been slowing since 1992. Between 1992 and 1995, Medicaid spending
grew at a 9.5% rate. Jane Anderson, Managed Care Not the Cause of Reduced Medicaid
Spending, Managed Care Outlook, West's Legal News, 1997 WL 8469578, 1 (Jan. 10, 1997). In
the last year, Medicaid grew by only 3%. Id. If these trends hold true for smoking-related
medical expenses, and there is reason to so conclude as the slowdown in Medicaid cost inflation
is due to greater efforts at cost management on the government's part, id., then cigarette excise
tax revenues may outstrip expenses.
187. See Part mI.C.
188. While federal receipts may not apply to the state's share of Medicaid expenses, they
certainly could be used to defray the federal share, the recovery of which is being sought by the
state.
189. Courts are to take into account that damages are awarded in advance of the time




future Medicaid expenses be reduced to a concrete figure. Therefore, a
calculation of the probability of increased costs is necessary before
determination of any damage award.
Thus, determining any damage award becomes at least specu-
lative and may even be impossible to determine. While both sides will
bring out econometricians, statisticians, and other expert witnesses, in
the final analysis, any real damage to Florida's Medicaid program may
be impossible to ascertain with a high degree of accuracy. In addition,
the jury is only human. After all the calculations and experts, the
tobacco companies may still confront a large damage award due to the
vagaries of human emotion and Florida law allowing the factfinder to
determine approximate awards. 19°
In addition, Florida faces the reality that, taking into account
only state excise taxes, no damages have in-fact been suffered to date
or will be for at least a few years. It will be at least several years
more before the surplus will be depleted. 191 If the factfinder includes
federal excise tax receipts in any damages calculation, state claims of
net medical costs at any point in the future are currently no better
than conjecture. A state plaintiff would have to wait a minimum of
several years, before it could reasonably claim certain proof of
increased smoking-related Medicaid costs.
Therefore, each side bears tremendous risk in the present
litigation. Both the plaintiff and the defendants in Florida's and other
states' litigation would be better served by a different approach to the
resolution of the problems caused by the consumption of cigarettes.
IV. A BETTER SOLUTION
Some commentators have gone so far as to advocate absolute
liability for tobacco companies. 192  Yet, absolute liability would
probably bankrupt the tobacco companies, 93 restrict state revenues,'9
and displace employees. Other experts have suggested requiring less
190. "We don't really have consistent, easy-to-understand controls over large awards." Civil
Trial Award Spark Rules Debate, Tennessean 12A (Jan. 12, 1997) (quoting Victor Schwartz,
counsel for American Tort Reform Association). Even more frightening to both the state and the
tobacco companies, damage awards are basically "a lottery." Id.
191. While this Note uses data for a thirteen year period, the court may take a longer period
into consideration in determination of the true applicable surplus.
192. See Vandall, 52 Ohio St. L. J. at 405 (cited in note 13).
193. See note 38 and accompanying text.
194. As a consequence of bankrupting the cigarette manufacturers, the state would lose
revenue currently generated from the cigarette excise tax. See note 175 and accompanying text.
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harmful cigarettes 95 or increasing the excise taxes with the proceeds
earmarked for smoking-related expenses. 196 While each solution has
merit, a combination of excise taxes, federal legislation preempting
tobacco-related lawsuits, establishing a settlement fund, and
regulations mandating safer cigarettes may offer the best solution.
197
A. Require Safer Cigarettes
Changing the composition of cigarettes may result in a decline
in smoking-related health care expenses. For example, a reduction in
the tar and nicotine levels of cigarettes may render them less lethal
and safer for consumption. 98 Government regulators could either
limit levels of harmful substances currently found in cigarettes or use
what has been termed the "market approach," which involves the
imposition of higher taxes on cigarettes with a more toxic composition,
thereby employing market forces to drive creation of less harmful
cigarettes.
Whichever of these methods may in the final analysis prove to
be the best path, the chief benefit from this approach would be a re-
duction in the human cost of smoking. This is an important policy
goal and may generate strong support for a national settlement. The
creation of safer cigarettes, however, is not an adequate solution by
itself. The possibility of higher future medical costs for individuals,
private insurers, and government health care programs should be
offset in some manner.9 9 In addition, one problem in the marketing of
safer tobacco products is that doing so may amount to an admission by
cigarette manufacturers of the prior sale of unsafe products leaving
the companies more vulnerable to litigation.200 Thus, safer cigarettes
may be only one important component in a comprehensive solution.
195. Gravelle and Zimmerman, CRS Report for Congress at 15 (cited in note 7).
196. See Elizabeth M. Whelan, A Smoking Gun: How the Tobacco Industry Gets Away With
Murder 151 (George F. Stickley Co., 1984).
197. In fact, there have been settlement negotiations between the states of Florida and
Mississippi and the tobacco companies. Tobacco Firms Want to Settle, Tennessean 2E (Feb. 18,
1997). Whether these settlement negotiations will be effective remains to be seen. However, the
smallest tobacco company, the Liggett Group, has already reached a settlement agreement with
twenty-two states. Liggett Breaks Banks, Agrees to Settlement, Tennessean 2A (Mar. 21, 1997).
198. Gravelle and Zimmerman, CRS Report for Congress at 15 (cited in note 7). Lowering
the amount of tar may be the best way to reduce tobacco related disease. Noah, U.S. News &
World Rep. at 67 (cited in note 8). Tar is the "chief culprit" in terms of smoking-related harm.
Id.
199. See Part IV.2.
200. Meade, 17 J. Legal Med. at 1335 (cited in note 49).
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B. Pass National Preemptive Legislation and Develop a
Settlement Fund
Though some tobacco foes advocate a new era of prohibition
ending the sale of cigarettes, America may not be able to afford to end
smoking as we know it. Medicare, another government program
which provides medical services, would incur a cost liability of be-
tween $204 and $2,745 for each "male light smoker" who quits con-
suming cigarettes at age forty-five.201 Presumably, those who quit
even earlier and smoked less will live comparatively longer and will
consume an even greater share of government funding. This is
particularly important considering that smokers subsidize non-
smokers' pensions to a large degree.20 2 Americans aged seventy-five
and older are expected to comprise nine percent of the population by
the year 2040.203 If the United States were to become tobacco-free, the
preponderance of all medical care would be gerontological by the early
part of the next century.20 4 Because medical costs have historically
risen faster than inflation,205 and care for the elderly continues to
make up a greater portion of overall medical expenses as life
expectancy increases, the costs of caring for former smokers would be
great.
The ability of the federal government to finance programs such
as Medicaid and Medicare is in question because these entitlements
comprise an increasing percentage of the federal budget.206 Because
medical expenses have risen sharply, even while the incidence of
cigarette smoking has declined,20 7 such entitlement programs face
greater pressure.
Perhaps the most plausible means of ending current state-
government litigation against the tobacco companies is an arrange-
ment in which cigarette sales would pay for smoking prevention and
cessation programs as well as to endow a fund for compensation of the
201. Warner, 258 JAMA at 2084 (cited in note 145).
202. Manning, et al., The Cost of Poor Health Habits at 63 (cited in note 10).
203. Warner, 258 JAMA at 2082 (cited in note 145).
204. Id.
205. See generally Anderson, West's Legal News at 1 (cited in note 186).
206. Robert P. Sigman, Congress Must Cut Back: Some Lawmakers to Do Better Than
Others in Trying to Balance the U.S. Budget, Kansas City Star Ki (June 23, 1996). See also
Frank Pompa and Dave Mathes, Changing Tax Scene, Tennessean 5E (Feb. 9, 1997).
207. Manning, et al., The Cost of Poor Health Habits at 2 (cited in note 10). In addition,
there are other forces at work. America responds to the needs of tobacco farmers while decrying
tobacco. While the federal government is busy collecting its $20 billion in annual cigarette
related tax revenue, it provides price supports to growers. Reiter, 29 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Prob. at
444 (cited in note 14).
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states, private insurers, and individuals who claim past, present, or
future tobacco-related expenses.2 8  Presumably, if the court
established such a fund at the national level, it would have to require
the pre-emption of all further litigation. The 1986 National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act 209 provides precedent for such a comprehensive
settlement. This solution would go a long way towards satisfying
many of tobacco's critics and present litigants.210
208. Mike France, Big Tobacco May Be Ready to Deal, Bus. Week 150 (Oct. 7, 1996). In fact,
there are many lobbyists with connections to the tobacco companies "putting out feelers" to see if
such a proposal would be acceptable to Congress, the states, the FDA, and other interested
parties. Id. Of course, cigarette manufacturers refuse to admit that such investigation is done
on their behalf. Id.
209. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa et seq. (1994
ed.). This Act relieves pharmaceutical manufacturers from vaccine-related liability and provides
special procedures for resolution of claims, thus removing the threat of litigation and huge
damage awards. Id. A similar approach could also relieve the threat of litigation from tobacco
companies. For a general discussion of the countours of the Act, see Keith Abbott, The National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 20 Colo. L. Rev. 1825 (1996).
210. Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Florida 1 (May 29, 1996) ("Our terms are
simple: tobacco must pay for the damage it does to our taxpayers and the industry must stop
targeting children in its marketing campaigns."). This proposal would be particularly effective
especially when combined with regulations that drive development of an increasingly safe
cigarette. See Part IVA.
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C. Raise National Excise Taxes
In addition to using money that would otherwise be spent on
litigation, an increase in the national excise tax on cigarettes could
generate the revenue required to endow a national fund of the requi-
site magnitude.211 Increased revenue from an additional twenty-five
cents per pack excise tax would amount to $25 billion per year.2' 2
The increased price of cigarettes would act to suppress the level
of consumption, particularly among youth.213 A higher tax could also
ameliorate society's general distaste for the habit by providing at least
the appearance that smokers are paying more.21 4
While detractors argue that any tax is subject to legislative
lobbying and may be diverted to alternative uses down the road,21 5
tobacco companies can, in fact, be counted on to keep Congress honest.
For example, if the funds are diverted from smoking-related costs to
other programs in excess of the costs imposed, legislators may be
tempted to impose added taxes on cigarettes or again allow lawsuits
against cigarette manufacturers. This should motivate the tobacco
companies to ensure that the settlement fund resources are utilized
for the purposes originally intended.
D. Benefits to All
Society at large would benefit from a national settlement in
other ways, as well. The top five tobacco companies alone could gain a
211. Admittedly, much negotiation would have to take place at the national legislative level
to reach consensus on such a tax. Although one may expect the cigarette manufacturers to have
opposed it, the governor of Florida is the party in the present litigation against such a move.
Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Florida, Memorandum to the National Media and
Washington Press Corps 1 (May 9, 1996) (describing Governor Lawton Chiles' rejection of a
proposed 18 cent increase in cigarette excise taxes). One may only speculate as to his true
motive given an understanding of the industry's inability to pay damages sought, see note 38, as
well as the state's effort to disgorge all the tobacco companies' profits earned in Florida as
requested in the Complaint. See note 80 and accompanying text.
212. Solomon and Katel, Newsweek at 152 (cited in note 32). The seventy-five cents per
pack tax originally proposed to fund President Clinton's failed health care initiative would
generate an even greater income stream for such a fund. Gravelle and Zimmerman, CRS Report
for Congress at i (cited in note 7).
213. Manning, et al., 261 JAMA at 1604 (cited in note 149); Gravelle and Zimmerman, CRS
Report for Congress at iii (cited in note 7). Although this would undermine the financial basis for
such a settlement over time, the decrease in loss of life due to tobacco consumption would
certainly be compensation. In addition, the extended period over which the numbers of smokers
would decrease would provide tobacco companies the opportunity to further diversify into other
markets and different product lines.
214. Even if it is more than their fair share. See Part I.C.1.
215. This has been one criticism of increasing the cigarette excise tax. Frohlich, 21 Am. J.
L. & Med. at 449 (cited in note 4).
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whopping $193 billion in market valuation overnight. 216 The actual
beneficiaries of any rise in the tobacco companies' values therefore
would be their shareholders. Most notably, retirement funds
currently have huge holdings of tobacco company stocks.217 Thus, the
true recipients of the benefits of settling the tobacco litigation war
include not only the parties involved in ongoing litigation, but also
tomorrow's retirees. In short, this settlement proposal can be good for
many parties, not least of which is the government, which may have to
make up any serious shortfalls in future retirees' incomes through
safety-net entitlement programs such as Medicaid.
V. CONCLUSION
Cigarette manufacturers note that cigarettes are a legal
product and that both society and the state governments presently
seeking recovery from the tobacco firms have made an overt policy
decision to allow the sale of tobacco products.218 Adults may legally
purchase and consume tobacco products. Businesses may
manufacture, distribute, and offer for sale tobacco products. Thus,
Florida and other states are essentially contending that the mere
distribution of an officially-sanctioned product is tortious and should
be prohibited. If the government, in essence, seeks to ban the
distribution and manufacture of cigarettes through the present
litigation, there should be an honest and forthright debate concerning
the decision in the legislature and the polity. Currently, however, the
best option for all parties is the enactment of legislation on the
national level that provides protection for manufacturers, their
shareholders and employees, as well as funding for cessation
programs, education of youth, and private and government-funded
health care.
All parties to present and future litigation benefit from the
proposed national settlement fund. In addition, the settlement would
benefit other parties, including government entities responsible for
retirement and medical benefits, smokers protected by regulations
requiring safer cigarettes, and possible future smokers dissuaded from
taking up the habit by increased excise taxes.2 9 Thus, while the
216. Solomon and Katel, Newsweek at 152 (cited in note 32).
217. Eisler, USA Today at IC (cited in note 112).
218. Donohue, 83 ABA J. at 54 (cited in note 14).
219. Members of other industries also have something to gain from ending publicity about
government crusades against manufacturers of products that have pronounced external costs,
such as liquor, motorcycles, and firearms. Although Florida promises not to employ the MTPLA
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problem of tobacco-related Medicaid expenses may turn out to be a
mirage, a real solution to the present controversy has substantial
advantages.
Christopher May*
against other segments of industry, Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Florida 1 (Feb.
19, 1996) (quoting the Governor's release to state legislators), continuation of this means of
generating revenue is possible through employment of other statutes or by other states. Indeed,
for government, increasing revenues by suing other industries is tempting. Donohue, 83 ABA J.
at 54 (cited in note 14) (quoting Dexter Douglas, general counsel to Florida Governor Chiles: "At
this point we don't have the statistics to proceed against [manufacturers of other products].
We're only going against tobacco. You gotta take 'em one at a time. I don't believe anybody could
handle all those industries at once").
* I thank Professor David Partlett at Vanderbilt University School of Law for his
guidance and input. I also want to thank my wife, Raiko, and my parents, John and Alexis for
their love and support. In addition, the able assistance of my editors, John Flippen, Karin
Hoppmann, and Matthew Curley, was invaluable in the preparation of this Note.
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